Supplement - THE CHEVRON PERIOD: 1974-92

111 These former Anyanya were stationed in the southern towns of Bor, Ayod, and Nasir and they mutinied in mid-1983 and went to Ethiopia to join the SPLM/A.
112 Speech, John Garang, March 3,1984, as reproduced in John Garang Speaks , ed. Mansour Khalid (New York: KPI, 1987), p.23.
113 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), an international organization with 182 member countries, was established in 1946 to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries under adequate safeguards to help ease balance of payments adjustment. Its operations involve surveillance as well as financial and technical assistance. See http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm. (accessed June 19, 2001)
114 The history of Sudanese oil development is discussed in J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003).
115 The company is now known as Chevron Corporation. According to its 2000 annual report, it is “one of the world’s largest integrated petroleum companies . . . involved in every aspect of the industry, from exploration and production to transportation, refining and retail marketing, as well as chemicals manufacturing and sales. It is active in more than 90 countries and employs about 34,000 people worldwide.” Chevron Annual Report, http://www.chevron.com (accessed April 24, 2001). In Africa it is active in Angola and Chad, among other places.
116 Mansour Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-may (London and Boston: KPI, 1985), p. 306.
117 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 198. See also Muriel Allen, “Sudan: Oil a Political Weapon in Southern Sudanese Politics,” Middle East Times (London), July 11, 1997.
118 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 240. According a former governor of Unity State, “Heglig point” was twenty-four kilometers inside the state. Taban Deng Gai, former governor of Unity State, Human Rights Watch interview, Khartoum, July 26, 1999.
119 The balanite tree was known by Dinka and Nuer names, Aling and Pan Thou, respectively. Ibid.
120 The name used in that era was supplied by Eoin S.C. Mekie, Finance Manager, Shell Company of the Sudan Ltd.. Email, Egbert Wesselink to Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2001. The Shell Company of The Sudan, Ltd., the name in use in 2001, is a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies. “Shell in Sudan,” http://www.shell.com (accessed April 24, 2001).
121 Talisman Energy, “Sudan—The Greater Nile Oil Project: Background Paper,” December 1998, p. 4.
122 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 244. See The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integrations, ed. Dunstan M. Wai (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 227, 229, 231.
123 Alier, Southern Sudan, pp. 200, 238.
124 Alier, Southern Sudan, pp. 239-40. In 2000, the government sold gold and copper concessions in Hofrat en Nahas in southwestern Sudan (now in Southern Darfur State) to a firm in the United Arab Emirates, provoking a strong condemnation from the SPLM/A. Samson L. Kwaje, SPLM/SPLA press release, “SPLM/SPLA Strongly Opposes Annexation Of Hufrat Al-Nahas [sic] To Southern Darfur State,” Nairobi, April 20, 2000; “Sudan Grants Gold, Copper Concession to UAE Firm,” Reuters, Khartoum, April 18, 2000.
125 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 239; see the insightful article published in October 1983 about the weaknesses in the Addis Ababa agreement by Nelson Kasfir, “Why the Addis Ababa Agreement No Longer Regulates the Links between the North, the National Government and the South in Sudan” (Working Manuscript, Dartmouth College, October 1983), p. 19.
126 Alier, Southern Sudan, pp. 241-42.
127 Between 1980 and 1983, President Nimeiri recombined provinces into regions. The three former provinces that made up the single Southern Region were each called regions when the Southern Region was broken up in 1983, using the former names: Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria.
128 Nelson Kasfir, “Why the Addis Ababa Agreement . . . ;” Sharon E. Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 3-5; D. H. Johnson, The Southern Sudan, Minority Rights Group Report No. 78 (London: MRG, 1988); D.H. Johnson, “North-South Issues,” in Sudan After Nimeiri , ed. Peter Woodward (London: Routledge Press, 1991).
129 Groups calling themselves Anyanya operating out of Ethiopia had existed since at least 1976. They did not agree with the Addis Ababa agreement and the creation of a southern autonomous region. They wanted southern independence instead. Various Nuer SPLA forces were never in Anyanya II: they included Riek Machar (studying outside of Sudan), later SPLA zonal commander of his home region, Western Upper Nile, and Cmdr. William Nyuon Bany (in the Sudanese army), the highest-ranking Nuer in the SPLM/A until his defection in 1992.
130 Nelson Kasfir, “Why the Addis Ababa Agreement . . . ,”p. 16; D.H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier, “The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,” in Civil War in the Sudan, p. 124. Earlier threats to transfer a southern battalion from Wau to the north sparked off the first civil war, in 1955; note that the Kasfir article says, “That event [transfer of the Wau battalion] is popularly, if incorrectly, considered to have initiated the civil war.” Actually, the level of armed insurgency during the first Anyanya war was low until the early 1960s, when Maj. Gen. Abboud came to power in 1958 and began to impose Islamization and Arabization measures on the south. Kasfir, “Why the Addis Ababa Agreement . . . .”
131 A soldier in Anyanya, John Garang had been integrated into the Sudanese army pursuant to the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 and gradually promoted to the rank of colonel. While in the Sudanese army, John Garang earned a Ph.D. at Iowa State University (U. S.) in agronomics, focusing his research on the adverse effects on southern Sudan of the planned Jonglei canal.
132 Alier, Southern Sudan, pp. 264-66; email, D. H. Johnson, April 30, 2001.
133 See Nelson Kasfir, “Why the Addis Ababa Agreement. . . .”
134 Before the mutiny, Col. John Garang and Samuel Gai Tut had been running guns to Anyanya II. Kerubino had been fighting Anyanya II. See D.H. Johnson and G. Prunier, “The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,” pp. 117-41.
135 Nuer mutineers from the Sudanese army in Western Upper Nile did not all go to Ethiopia. Some stayed with their arms in their area to protect their people against the Baggara, who were increasing their attacks on Nuer and Dinka communities with the aid of government or Umma Party armament. Some armed Nuer engaged in banditry.
136 One of the first to benefit from this Ethiopian support was Sadiq al Mahdi of the Umma Party, following the failed Umma Party coup attempt in Sudan in 1976. Email, D. H. Johnson, April 30, 2001; M.W. Daly, “Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: The Political and Economic Background of the Sudanese Civil War,” in Civil War in the Sudan, p. 20.
137 Carol Berger, “From Cattle Camp to Slaughterhouse: The Politics of Identity Among Cuban-Educated Dinka Refugees in Canada” (unpublished dissertation for the Master of Arts at the University of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, October 2, 2001).
138 Biel Torkech Rambang, Nuer representative in the U.S., Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2001.
139 These were originally young Baggara armed men who traveled with their families’ cattle herds to provide protection. Muraheleen is the Misseriya Baggara word for travelers, which now refers to all Baggara militias of southern Darfur and Kordofan. The Rizeigat word for this group of young men is fursan, or cavalry, although they are called muraheleen.
The government, which initially came to power in a military-Islamist coup in 1989, incorporated the muraheleen into their army (usually as Popular Defence Forces or PDF), used army officers to train and command them, and conducted joint military operations in the south with them, particularly along the Babanusa-Wau railway.
140 The population around Mayom was about one person per square mile in peacetime, according to a development worker. Roger Schrock, formerly affiliated with the NSCC, Nairobi, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Iowa, October 28, 1999.
141 Social scientist David Keen observes that political and economic developments starting in the mid-1960s eroded the earlier system of protection by exposing the vulnerability of southern Sudanese to exploitative processes. At the same time these developments provided certain groups in the north, such as the marginalized Baggara, with both the motive and the ability to deepen this exploitation through the use of force. Keen, Benefits of Famine, pp. 18-19.
142 The year 1982 saw the last efforts of the Sudanese government army to keep the peace—in particular the last clashes between government soldiers and the armed Baggara in Western Upper Nile (between Abiemnon and Mayom), wherethe government attempted to quell Baggara raids into the south. Roger Schrock, interview, October 28, 1999. The central government, however, continued to support peace conferences among northern and western ethnic groups who had disputes over cattle raiding and land use. See De Waal, “Militias,” p. 146; Human Rights Watch, “Sudan,” World Report 2000 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 80.
143 The Ngok Dinka lived in Abyei District in southern Kordofan on the northern side of the north/south border. Keen, Benefits of Famine, p. 79. Their displacement appears related to Baggara land and water hunger rather than oil, but the Baggara were nonetheless favored by the government in this contest between Arab and African citizens.
144 Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, 1998:The Human Rights Causes (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 31-35.
145 Among these Baggara were poachers; non-Baggara poachers also entered the Unity oilfield area in the early 1980s hunting for a herd of about seventy-six elephants between Pariang and Bentiu. The hunters caught most of these elephants, and by 1983 only twelve remained. To reach the herd, the nomads came from Muglad through Heglig to Unity, then back by the eastern Nuba Mountains. Roger Schrock, interview, October 28, 1999.
146 All outsiders who have worked with the Nuer and other southerners note that the Nuer, on foot, cover twice as much territory as outsiders, in the same time. Therefore what is two hours walking (or “footing”) for the Nuer is four hours walking for outsiders.
147 Former combatant, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 3, 2000.
148Ibid.
149 Former school administrator, interview, August 1-2, 2000.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid. Bilpam, Ethiopia, had been the main training camp for southern rebels during the 1955-72 civil war, and was a base camp for Anyanya II in the 1970s and early 1980s. S. E. Hutchinson, interview, April 18, 2001.
152 See former school administrator, interview, August 1-2, 2000. There were nine Bul Nuer sections on the 1954 taxpayers’ list, organized into two main sections, the Nyang (also called Kwac) and Gok. D. H. Johnson, email, April 30, 2001. See former school administrator, interview, August 1-2, 2000.
153 Ibid.
154 The Ruweng (Panaru) Dinka on the east of the Block 1 oilfields tended to stay north of the river in Block 1 Nuer areas because there were no adjacent Dinka communities immediately to the south. Those Dinka who fled the Ruweng area occasionally went east to the Shilluk (Tonja) or to the Nuer areas of Duar and Nhialdiu south of Bentiu and the river. Ibid.
There is a pocket of Ruweng Dinka southeast of Tonja and south of the Nile, at Atar. Atar is an SPLA area from which its Dinka SPLA commander, George Atar, occasionally moves up into the Dinka area in northeastern Western Upper Nile (Block 1).
155 Taban Deng was born in Kerial (Ker-riaal), a Leek village near the current Unity oilfield that has since been destroyed. He identifies himself as (western) Jikany Nuer. Taban Deng Gai, “Talisman False Community Development Claims in Western Upper Nile,” South Sudan Post (Nairobi), February 2001, p. 12; Taban Deng, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, April 9, 2001. The South Sudan Post is the only news periodical dedicated to events in southern Sudan. It is published in Nairobi and its editor is John Luk, an attorney, political activist, former commander in Lou Nuer areas, and sometime member of the SPLM/A.
156 Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999. Another source said that in 1983, Chevron paid some compensation to the dislocated when it was building roads. Simon Kun, executive director, Relief Association of Southern Sudan (RASS), Nairobi, July 23, 1999.
157 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas, pp. 34-36. The author conducted fieldwork among the Leek Nuer west of Bentiu and north of the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River between December 1980 and February 1983. Sharon E. Hutchinson, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Madison, Wisconsin, April 18, 2001.
158 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas, p. 5.
159 Africa Watch, Denying “The Honor of Living”—Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster (New York: Africa Watch, 1990), p. 88.
160 Ibid. Kala azar, a parasitic disease also known as visceral leishmaniasis, causes chronic fever, swelling of the spleen and liver, anaemia and diarrhea. If left untreated, more than nine out of every ten people infected die, usually from uncontrolled bleeding. Sudan has suffered many epidemics of the disease in recent history, resulting in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of deaths. Treatment must be administered by trained health workers at regularly spaced intervals to have effect, and the medicine may be harmful if not used correctly. World Health Organization (WHO), “Leishmaniasis,” Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/leish/leisdis1.html. (accessed April 30, 2001)
161 Ibid. The acacia forest is the prime habitat for the sandfly which carries the parasite which causes kala azar; Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Violence, Health and Access to Aid in Unity State/Western Upper Nile, April 2002, pp. 20-23.
162 According to MSF, the four factors associated with the spread of the disease are all related to the war: spread of the sandfly (re-growth of the acacia forests due to reduced cattle grazing led to an increase in the sandfly population, becoming a large vector pool for the parasite); introduction of the parasite (military moving within the area and between Ethiopia and Sudan in the mid-1980s); increased transmission of the disease (due to war and displacement, people seeking safety and foraging for food in the acacia forests); and high susceptibility to the disease (mass starvation in the mid-late 1980s, no health care services, limited humanitarian access). Ibid., pp. 20-21.
163 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 243.
164 Africa Watch, Denying “The Honor of Living,” p. 88.
165 Carol Berger, “Oil and ‘Spearchuckers,’” Economist (London), 1985 (author’s copy).
166 Carol Berger, “Drive to re-open Sudan oilfield,” Africa Analysis (London), Muglad, Southern Kordofan, June 10, 1988.
167 Muriel Allen, “Sudan: Oil a Political Weapon,” July 11, 1997.
168 Roger Schrock, interview, October 28, 1999.
169 “Funeral Scheduled at Poteau for Oklahoman Shot in Sudan,” Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City), December 8, 1983.
170 Alier, Southern Sudan, p. 243.
171 Biel Torkech Rambang, interview, March 6, 2001. Several others gave similar versions of the event, all mentioning Bul Nyawan as commander. “Anyanya II’s commander Bul Nyawan attacked Chevron and closed it down. He was fighting the Baggara since 1981 and closed down Chevron in 1983 [sic]. His deputy in that attack was Paulino Matiep. Also James Lial Dieu, who is with SPDF now.” James Kok, Nairobi representative for SPDF, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Nairobi, March 15, 17, 2001.
172 “Chevron to Resume Sudan Operations,” Dow Jones News Service (New York), March 9, 1984.
173 Ibid.
174 “Sudan Accord With Saudi Financier Puts Pressure on Chevron to Develop Oil Fields,” Wall Street Journal (New York), November 1, 1984.
175 See John Ashworth, Sudan Focal Point-Africa, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, August 10, 2000. Ashworth was one of the priests. The other foreigner, Fr. Peter Major, reportedly now serves in northern Sudan.
176 “Sudan Won=t Receive Any New IMF Loans,” Wall Street Journal (New York), February 4, 1986. In 1982, the government had received a rescue package from the IMF, World Bank, and donor governments amounting to $ 1.5 billion a year in aid and, at the time of the default, the Sudanese had an accumulated foreign debt of U.S. $ 9 billion requiring annual interest payments of U.S. $ 800 million. David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Suspends $ 194 Million In Aid to Sudan,” Washington Post, February 17, 1985; “Sudan Asks U.S. Help to Pay IMF Debt,” AP, December 29, 1985; “Sudan Asks U.S., Saudis To Pay Arrears to IMF,” Wall Street Journal (New York), Khartoum, December 30, 1985; James R. Peipert, “Sudan Near Agreement with International Monetary Fund,” AP, January 25, 1986. The U.S. did assist Sudan by asking the IMF to help reschedule the debt several times. D. H. Johnson, email, April 30, 2001.
177 David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Suspends $ 194 Million in Aid to Sudan,” Washington Post, February 17, 1985; Charles T. Powers, “Washington Pushes for Reform; Debt, Drought, and Chaos Plague U.S. Ally Sudan,” Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1985. In 1990, the IMF issued a declaration of noncooperation against Sudan, which remained in place until 1999. The IMF suspended Sudan’s voting and related rights in 1993 and did not reinstate them until 2000, after the government had made certain reforms and paid some IMF debt, and oil production and export had begun. IMF, “IMF Lifts Declaration of Noncooperation from Sudan,” News Brief No. 99/52, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1999; IMF, “IMF Lifts Suspension of Sudan’s Voting and Related Rights,” Press Release No. 00/46, Washington, D.C., August 1, 2000. Sudan’s problems with the IMF coincided with its failure to develop its oil resources. See, e.g., IMF, “Sudan: Recent Economic Developments,” Staff Country Report No. 99/53, Washington, D.C., June 1999.
178 Blaine Harden, “Rebel Chief Coming for Talks, Sudan Says Leader’s Aides Deny It, Say War Is On,” Washington Post, April 19, 1985.
179 “Sudan Warns Chevron over Israeli Goods,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 1985. Chevron responded that the import of Israeli parts had been unintentional and the parts would be sent back to England.
180 Apparently, en route to his office, Clement stopped his car in front of the PLO office to listen to a company message on his car radio, commonly used for communications within Sudan. This was mistakenly seen as a surveillance operation. “Sudanese Detain, Release American,” San Diego Union-Tribune, October 28, 1985.
181 “Chevron to Suspend Exploration in Sudan,” Dow Jones News Service (New York), December 24, 1985.
182 The Umma Party continues to draw most of its support from the Ansar (Sufi) religious brotherhood in Omdurman and western Sudan, and the DUP most of its support from Khatmiyya (Sufi) brotherhood in the central Nile valley and eastern Sudan.
183 An internal power struggle led to the formation of a breakaway party, the Popular National Congress Party, in June 2000. Mohamed Osman, “Sudan Islam Leader Forms New Party,” AP, Khartoum, June 27, 2000.
184 The Timsa Battalion was commanded by former Sudanese army officer Arok Thon Arok (deceased 1998), and the Tiger Battalion by Salva Kiir Mayardit, now chief of staff of the SPLA.. See, e.g., James Kok, interviews, March 15, 17, 2001; Biel Torkech Rambang, interview, March 6, 2001.
185 While they were still in Anyanya II in the early 1980s, Maj. Bul Nyawan and his deputy, Cmdr. James Lial Dieu, tried to fend off the Baggara. Bul Nyawan joined the SPLM/A after it arrived in Western Upper Nile. Both sides, the SPLA and the Baggara muraheleen, sustained heavy losses in the March 1985 battle but subsequently the Baggara enterred into a peace agreement with Riek Machar, SPLA zonal commander. Bul Nyawan, who is fondly remembered by the Nuer, was killed in that battle. Biel Torkech Rambang, interview, March 6, 2001; James Kok, interviews, March 15, 17, 2001; RASS officer and former school administrator, interview, August 1-2, 2000.
186 Riek Machar, former SPLA zonal commander of Western Upper Nile, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, August 8, 2000. He said his forces, after walking several days, were exhausted when they reached Heglig and withdrew in the face of the fresh government troops based at the oilfield.
187 Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999.
188 Former soldier under Tito Biel, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 21, 1999.
189 Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999.
190 Paulino Matiep allegedly saved Omar El Bashir’s life on at least one occasion. During a traditional Nuer celebration in 1989, Lieutenant General Bashir (then serving in Mayom) reportedly joined in firing his gun into the air and accidentally shot dead a young Nuer woman. Her relatives were ready to kill him when Cmdr. Paulino Matiep intervened, paying cows to the family in compensation. President Sadiq al Mahdi accused Lieutenant General Bashir of killing the girl. RASS officer and former school administrator, interview, August 1-2, 2000. There are several similar versions of this episode.
191 Deborah Scroggins, “Sudan: Waiting for Majaa Reet Goach: Nuer Tribesman,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, March 10, 1991, based on interviews in Rok-Rok, Sudan on December 5, 1990. In 1999, there were three garrisons in Bentiu: one near the civilian hospital (two battalions), one near the primary and secondary school complex (one battalion), and one at the end of the airport on the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River (one battalion). Thomas Duoth, SSDF military intelligence official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, July 22, 1999.
192 Jallaba is an Arabic term for merchant, trader, or importer; in nineteenth and twentieth century Sudan it applied to itinerant petty merchants. In southern Sudan it has the additional (historical) meaning of slave trader, and applies generally to all northern Sudanese. Jallabiya refers to their typical robe of white cotton.
193 Scroggins, “Sudan: Waiting for Majaa Reet Goach.” The interviewee also told the journalist, “The jallaba want us to move away from there. The oil was found that time by the white people. But it was not functioning well. The jallaba, he is fighting for the oil. He cannot leave the oil there. That is why he is fighting people there. And we also know the oil is ours. That is why there is heavy fighting.” Scroggins, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Atlanta, May 15, 2000.
194 Former combatant, interview, August 3, 2000.
195 The third commander, Dr. Lam Akol, is Shilluk. He has written about his experiences inside the SPLM/A in Dr. Lam Akol, SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 2001).
196 See Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan, p. 94. Nyaba blames the breakaway faction for initiating these summary executions and the attacks on civilians that followed.
197 The Riek Machar faction and Nuer armed civilians (the White Army) conducted a massive series of raids into Dinka Bor County in Upper Nile, massacring about 2,000 civilians in the course of looting hundreds of thousands of cattle in 1991. Independent interviews at the time suggested that the raiders may have been partly inspired by perceived favoritism of the relief community, which was believed to be allocating more food to the Dinka than the Nuer. Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), pp. 94-99.
198 Human Rights Watch/Africa, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties to the War in Southern Sudan (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), p. 146. The triangle was formed by the villages Ayod, Waat, and Kongor, all in Upper Nile on the Dinka/Nuer border on the East Bank of the Nile. The first two villages are Nuer, the third Dinka.
199 Jok Madut Jok and Sharon E. Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities” (Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, and University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999), pp. 10-11. By some estimates this fighting, until it was brought to a close, was more deadly than the SPLA-Sudanese government fighting. Ibid.
200 Jok and Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Civil War,” p. 6.
201 Jok and Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Civil War,” pp. 10-12. In fact, women and children had been killed in some Nuer-Dinka clashes long before 1991. But these tactics were not considered fair, and they were not the norm.
202 The subordination of the chiefs to the military had begun in the 1930s. D. H. Johnson, email, April 30, 2001.
203 Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation, p. 3. A RASS official said that they only received arms from the government from 1991-93. RASS official, August 2000 (anonymity requested).
204 According to the Indian Ocean Newsletter, Khartoum sought 100 percent of the revenues for ten years and Cmdr. Lam Akol, representing the Riek Machar faction, proposed a 50-50 split of oil revenues for two years. No agreement on oil revenues was reached with this faction. “Sudan: Significant Air Crash,” Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), September 11, 1993.